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*  * A.  REPOfl'J'  OF  MR  CHARPENTIE 
Introduction 
The  international  monetary  situation became 
even  more  unstable  towards  the  end  of  1977  and  in  the 
early part of 1978.  Exchange  rates  fluctuated  widely 
and  the  US  dollar went  into  a  rapid slide.  Were  this 
state of affairs  to  continue  it could,  in  the  longer 
term,  have  an  adverse  effect  on  the  economic  situation 
and  on  employment  in  the  Community. 
It could  also  spark off new  increases  in  oil 
prices. 
Monetary  Instability  is  harmful  to  good 
International  relations,  undermines efforts being  made 
in  Europe  and  elsewhere  to  conquer  the  problems  of 
inflation and  unemployment,  and  encourages protectionist 
tendencies which  are  already affecting world  trade  and 
are  threatening to  spread  to  intra-Community  relations. 
Confronted with  this situation,  the  Economic 
and  Social  Committee  decided  to  consider  the  issue  on 
its own  initiative and  to  attempt  to  define  the  con-
ditions  for  a  "Community  Approach  to  the  Present 
International  Monetary  Disorder". - 2  -
Such  is  the  aim  of  the  present  Report  and 
Opinion,  which  look  into existing ways  and  means  of 
tackling the  problems  at both  international  and 
Community  level. 
The  Economic  and  Social  Committee  docs  not 
;;et  out  to  propose  technical  or political  solutions. 
Experts  and  political  leaders  have  already  been  studying 
and  discussing these  for  several  years  now.  Its  aim  is 
a  more  modest  one  :  to  suggest  certain lines of  approach 
and  determine  the  conditions  for  a  return  to  normality. 
The  Committee  is well  aware,  however,  that  the  ultimate 
aim  must  be  to  eliminate  international  monetary  disorder 
and  intolerable  balance-of-payments disequilibria,  and 
that  to  this end it is necessary  above  all  to  seek  a 
better balance  between  growth  and  stability at world 
level. - 3  -
l .  SURVEY  OF  TilE  MAIN  MONETARY  EVENTS  SINCE  BRETTON 
WOODS  AND  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  PRESENT  SITUATION 
a)  Survey of the  main  monetary  events  since 
Bretton Woods 
Before  passing  judgement  on  the  current 
international  monetary disorder it would  be  useful  to 
briefly recall  the  major milestones of recent monetary 
history and  describe  as  simply as  possible  the  complex 
problem of world  currency  relationships  and  the  rules 
governing  these  relationships  in  1978. 
General  observations  on  the  international  monetary  system 
The  rip~t to print money  is a  regalian right, 
i.e.  a  right  connected with  the  exercise of sovereignty. 
This  explains why  the  privilege of being able  to  create 
money  has  gradually  become  a  State monopoly,  even if 
the  State itself puts  the  actual  job  in  the  hands  of  a 
bank of issue constituted under private bar. 
There  are  no  problems  of principle  regarding 
a  currency circulating within  the  territory under  the 
jurisdiction of the  issuing State,  since  the  public 
authorities of that State can  always  decree  a  compulsory 
rate for  the  currency  issued  there. 
But it is quite  a  different matter when  it 
comes  to  a  State wanting  to  get  its currency accepted 
by  economic  operators  who  do  not  come  under its authority, - 4  -
for example  when  it wants  to  pay  for  imports  in its own 
national  currency. 
Hence  all  the  difficulties and complexity of 
international  currency relationships. 
A  currency will  in point of fact  only  be 
accepted if people  have  confidence  in  it and  in  the 
issuing authority.  In  other words  it must  have  credit 
worthiness. 
For centuries  and  indeed until quite  recently 
(15  August  1971  to  be  exact)  it was  believed that this 
could  be  achieved  by  using as  national  or international 
currency precious  metals  (gold  and  silver)  with  an 
intrinsic value  or currencies  that were  convertible  into 
gold  (gold standard or gold  exchange  standard). 
The  obvious  strength of  such  a  system was  that 
all par value  or exchange  rate  problems  could  be  solved, 
since  the  gold  standard was  immutable  - at  least  in 
theory.  The  only  snag was  that gold production  and  stocks 
lagged  way  behind  the  needs  nf national  economies  and  the 
expanding  volume  of world  trade.  To  get  round  this dif-
ficulty  a  whole  host of  systems were  conjured up,  all of 
which  led  to  the  creation of  "monetary  symbols"  on  the 
part of issuing authorities,  whilst  the  fiction of  a  tie - 5  -
with gold was  preserved.  In  fact,  what  was  really 
happening was  that pyramids  were  being built upside  down 
and  they were  tottering precariously on  their apexes. 
Bretton Woods 
Although  the  war  had  brought  about  a  wholesale 
redistribution of bullion reserves  between countries, 
Bretton Woods  was  in  no  way  an  exception  to  the  rule 
described above  but merely  reaffirmed  the  pivotal  role 
of gold  in  the  international  monetary  system,  since  IMF 
members  had  to  declare  the  par values  of their currencies 
in  terms  of gold  or  the  dollar  (35  dollars equalled one 
ounce  of fine  gold)  and  were  required  to  buy  or sell 
their own  currency as appropriate  in order  to  ensure  that 
the  market  rate kept within  a  margin of  1%  on either side 
of the  declared par value. 
Par values  could  be  adjusted only with  the 
prior approval  of the  IMF'nnd  only if there  was  a 
"fundamental  disequilibrium",  a  notion  that was  never 
precisely defined.  The  two  basjc  aims of  the  Bretton 
Woods  Agreement  were  to 
- fix  exchange  rates between  the  currencies of  IMF 
members  numbering  44  in  1946  and  127  today)  since 
these exchange  rates were  expressed  in  terms  of gold; - 6  -
- institute  a  system  for settling payments,  as well  as 
a  system  for  extending credit  to deficit countries, 
through  the  use  of  drawing rights based  on  quotas 
equivalent  to  members'  subscriptions  in  gold or in 
their own  currency. 
Finally,  Article  8  of  the  Articles of Agreement 
of  the  IMF  made  it compulsory  for  each member,  after the 
transitional period,  to  remove  all  exchange  controls  in 
respect  of current  transactions  and  to  guarantee,  vis-a-vis 
other countries,  the  convertibility of its own  currency 
for  the  settlement of  such  transactions. 
Implementation of  the  Bretton  Woo~s  Agre~~ent 
The  proposed  objectives were  only partially 
attained and  the  di~equilibria set  in  motion  by  the 
Agreement  finally brought  about  the  downfall  of  the 
~ystem, 
The  goal  of fixed  exchange  rates was  not  fully 
attained due  to  failure  to  apply  the  relevant  measures 
rigorously.  Some  countries never declared par values, 
others declared  several  par values  (multiple  exchange 
rates)  and  yet  others floated  their currencies without 
incurrtng any  sanctions. - 7  -
Mast  devaluations  were  decided  on  without  the 
agreement of,  or even prior consultation with,  the  IMF, 
so  that during  the  thirty years  the  Agreement  was  in 
operation there  were_ con.siderable  exchange  rate adjust-
ments  between currencies,  even  though  these  adjustments 
had  the  advantage  aver floating of being officially 
registered in devaluations  or revaluations  in  terms  of 
the  key  currency,  the  dollar. 
One  thing in  the  IMF's  favour  that must  be 
recognized,  however,  is that  the  Fund  has  made  it much 
easier for central  banks  to settle payments with  one 
another,  and  this  in  turn has  furthered  the  development 
of world  trade.  The  IMF  has  achieved  this by  regularly 
increasing drawing  rights and  expanding credit facili-
ties  through  : 
- the  introduction in  1952  of  the  gold  tranche  (for 
which  the  agreement  of the  IMF  is automatic)  and 
stand-by credit  (where  authoritization is given for 
a  specific period of  time  and  the credit can  be  used 
any  time  during that period); 
- the  introduction in  1953  of compensatory  finance 
facilities,  particularly for  the benefit of developing 
countries to compensate  for fluctuations  in their 
export earnings; - 8  -
- the  introduction  in  19GB  of Special  Drawing  Rights  in 
addition  to  the  ordinary drawing  rights based  on  quotas 
and  subscriptions  to  the  Fund. 
The  IMF  has  frequently  come  to  the  aid of 
countries threatened  by  serious balance-of-payments 
disequilibria. 
Finally,  the  Bretton  Woods  system  can  also  take 
credit  for  the  fact  that  a  good  many  countries  have  got 
rid of exchange  control  and  made  their currencies con-
vertible  once  more. 
It is fair  to  say  then  that,  if the  Bretton 
Woods  Agreement  had  been applied  more  rigorously,  it 
might  have  lasted and  even  survived  the crisis resulting 
from  the  four-fold  increase  in ojl  prices.  Unfortunately, 
however,  it carried within  itself the  seeds of disequili-
bria and  tensions. 
The  dollar crisis and  the  end  of  the  Bretton  Woods  System 
Though  officially pegged  to  gold,  the  par values 
df national  currencies were  also  pegged  to  the  dollar. 
In fact  the  Bretton Woods  Agreement  explicitly provided 
for  this by putting the  dollar-gold  link  on  an official 
footing,  even  though  there  was  no  question of currencies 
being tied officially to  the  dollar.  This  thinking was 
understandable at  a  time  when  the  United States held  the - 9  -
bulk of  Lhe  world'8  gold  reserveR  and  it was  inconceivable 
that  the  dollar could be  devalued  in  terms  of gold. 
In these  circumstances,  central banks  and 
economic  operators preferred  to  hold dollars or dollar 
claims  (Eurodollars)  which,  whilst providing  the  same 
security as  eold,  were  superior in that they brought  in 
interest:  "the  dollar is gold  that  earns  interest",  as 
the  saying went. 
The  United States  thus  found  it hard  to  resist 
the  temptation  to  export  substantial  amounts of capital 
to  industrialized countries  and  this  led to  a  disequili-
brium  in its balance  of payments. 
So,  whilst  the  United States accumulated  long-
term .claims against  foreign  countries,  the latter accumu-
lated current  claims against  the  United States;  these 
claims  increasingly outbal'anced American  eold stocks. 
In  the  early 1960s,  this situation brought  on 
a  first  loss of confidence  in  the  dollar and measures 
were  taken  to control  gold  speculation. - 10  -
The  proper  remedy  would  have  been  to  bring  the 
United  States'  balance  of  payments  permanently  into 
equilibrium.  Unfortunately,  however,  the  appearance  of 
inflationary  tendencie_s  i!]  the  United States,  a  trade 
deficit at  the  end  of  the  1960s,  and  the  need  to  finance 
the  Vietnam war  and  foreign  aid all  conspired  to  steadily 
worsen  the  US  payments  deficit. 
To  protect its currency  and  honour  its commit-
ments,  the  United  States  was  forced  to  dip  into its gold 
reserves.  In fact,  its stock of gold fell  to  the  equiva-
lent of about  10,000 million dollars  in  the  spring of 
1971,  when  there  was  a  new  burst of speculation  in  gold, 
the  German  mark,  other European  currencies  and  the  yen, 
whilst  gold  rose  to  45  dollars an  ounce  on  the  free  market. 
On  lC,  August  1971,  th"  President  of  the  United 
States  suspended convertibility of  the  dollar  into  gold 
and  into other foreign  currencies.  This  effectively 
marked  the  end  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system. 
The  Smithsonian  Agreement 
The  Smithsonian Agreement  concluded  by  the  Group 
of  Ten  in December  1971  was  designed  to  put  an  end  to  the 
world  monetary .chaos  that had  existed since  the  decision 
of  15  August  1971. - 11  -
Under  the  Smithsonian Agreement 
- a  new  set of par values  in relation  to  the  dollar were 
fixed  for  the main currencies; 
- the  dollar was  devalued  by  8%  in  terms  of gold  (from 
35  dollars per ounce  to  38 dollars per ounce);  this 
was  the first devaluation of the dollar since  1934 
and  the  third since  1792; 
- the  bands within which  exchange  rate  fluctuations  were 
allowed  were  widened  from  1%  to  2.25% either side of 
parity. 
Although  the  United States maintained  non-
convertibility of  the  dollar into  gold  - which  made  the 
parity of  38 dollars  to  the  ounce  wholly  academic  - the 
dollar nevertheless  retained its dominant  position, 
since it was  in  terms  of that currency that  the  exchange 
rates of other currencies continued  to  be  expressed. 
Under  the  Smithsonian  Agreement  then,  the 
United States was  released  from  all obligations and 
constraints  (i.e.  convertibility of  the  dollar  into 
gold),  though at  the  same  time  it retained all  the 
privileges reserved  for  the  dollar.  It should  be  rec6g-
nized,  however,  that such privileges were,  to  a  large 
extent,  a  reflection of the  confidence  which central 
banks  and  economic  operators continued  - perhaps  faute 
de  mieux  - to place  in  the American  currency. - 12  -
From  the  Smithsonian  Acreement  to  the  Jamaica  Agreement 
The  Smithsonian Agreement  in  fact  solved  nothing 
and  the  world  entered_a  p~riod of monetary  anarchy  that 
was  by  no  means  a  short-lived phenomenon. 
The  United  States'  payments  deficit continued 
to  grow  :  liquid  funds  expanded  dangerously  and  the 
dollar steadily depreciated,  whilst harder currencies 
(particularly  the  German  mark)  rose  in value  on  a  large 
scale  (50%  increase  in  terms  of  the  dollar and  20%  increase 
in  terms  of all  the  other main  currencies between  1970  and 
1975).  Speculation against  the  dollar  returned with 
renewed  vigour  and at  the  beginning of  1972  one  ounce  of 
fine  gold  was  worth  50  dollars. 
Faced with  this  increasingly anarchistic  situa-
tion,  individual  countries as  well  as  international 
institutions began  to  look  for  solutions  - or at  the  very 
least palliative measures. 
In April  1972,  the  Member  States  of  the  EEC 
conceived  the  idea of  the  European  "snake"  and  undertook 
to  ensure  that  the  exchange  rates of their currencies did 
not  fluctuate  by  more  than  2.25%  (giving  a  maximum  diver-
gence  of  4.5% between  any  two  EEC  currencies),  while - 13  -
remuinin2 within  u  broader  band  in  relation to  the 
dollar  (the  tunnel). 
·-
The  IMF  decidPd  to  set  up  the  Committee  of 
Twenty  to  prepare  a  reform  or  the  international monetary 
system.  Several  dc~veloping r.ountries  were  members  of 
this  Committee. 
In  June  1972,  however.  the  United  Kingdom 
decided  to  float  the  pound  and  her  example  was  soon 
followed  by  Italy  (January  1973). 
Early in  1973  there  was  a  new  upsurge  in  world 
speculation against  the  dollar,  which  was  devalued  from 
38  to  4?.22  dollars per ounce  ot·  gold. 
Japan  and  Swit.zerl:1nd  dc·eid('d  to  float  thelr 
curr~ncies and  in  ~larch  1973  l.hc  cuunt.ries  of  the  "snake" 
agrer:d  to  do  likewise  in  rPlatinn  to  the  dollar.  The 
"snake"  left  the  tunnel.  The  tunnel  in  fact  no  longer 
existed. 
In spite of cvcrythinp,,  the  EEC  tried during 
this  period  to  make  further  progress  towards  economic 
and monetary  union,  and  in April  1973  set up  the  European 
Monetary  Cooperation  Fund  (EMCF),  to  be  administered  by 
the  nank  for  International  SPttlcments  (1). 
(1)  Sec  infra. - l4  -
Finally,  at  a  meeting  held  in Nairobi  in 
September  1973,  the  Committee  of Twenty  laid  the  founda-
tions  for  new  monetary  rules. 
The  main  elements  of  the  new  system  included 
-stable but  adjustable  par values  (i.e.  something midway 
between  fixed parities and  floating  exchange  rates); 
- the  protection of  exchange  rates  between  any  given  pair 
of currencies,  as  in  the  European  "snake"  and  no  longer 
between  an  individual  currency  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
dollar on  the  other; 
privileged position; 
the  dollar  thus  lo~t Its previously 
- arrangements  whereby  the  responsibility for restoring 
balance  would  no  longer  lie solely with debtor countries 
but would  also  be  shouldered,  where  appropriate,  by 
creditor countries. 
A  few  weeks  after  the  Nairobi  Conference  came 
the  oil crisis and,  concurrently,  a  general  rise  in  raw 
material  and  foodstuff prices.  This  threw  the  whole 
question  open  again,  affected  the  balance  of power  and 
resulted  in  a  geographical  redintribution of foreign 
exchange  reserves. - 1  ~)  -
'l'o  help  oil  and  raw  maLerial  importing countries, 
the  EEC  (at  ZeisL  in  April  1974)  and  the  IMF  ~in June) 
decided  to mobilize  eold assets at  the  free  market  rate. 
Some  countries in fact.rey{llorized  their gold  reserves. 
These  measures,  however,  were  but palliatives 
and  in  1974  the  IMF  took  two  decisions  one  after the  other, 
in  order  to  continue,  despite  everything along the  chosen 
path  and  attend  to  the  most  ureent  needs 
- the  value  of the  SDR  would  be  fixed  in  relation  to  a 
"basket"  of currencies  instead of gold  or  the  dollar; 
- there  would  be  a  general  increase  in quotas. 
Links  with  the  eold  standard  and  the  dollar were 
thus  abandoned  and  replaced by  a  unit  of account  as  the 
pivot of the  monetary  system. 
The  SDR  was  related  to  a  basket of  16  currencies 
which  included  : 
- 0.40  US  dollar 
- 0.38  German  mark 
- 0.04~>  pound  :,;t.erl ing 
- 0.14  French  franc. - 16  -
The  composition of  the  basket was  calculated  in 
such  a  way  that  on  the  first  day  of operations,  i.e. 
28  June  1974,  each of  the  16  currencies  was  weighted  more 
or  less  in  line  with its share  in world  trade.  The  dollar 
no  longer enjoyed  absolute  pre-eminence,  since  the  curren-
cies of the  EEC  countries  taken  together  in  the  basket 
carried more  weight  than  the  US  dollar. 
The  SDR  is not  a  genuine  standard,  since  in 
reality it is but  a  convenient  way  of evaluating  a  currency 
in  relation  to all  the  other currencies  in  the  basket.  In 
the  present  monetary  system  a  sLandard  no  longer exists. 
The  value  of  a  currency  can  be  recorded;  it 
cannot  be  determined. 
The  SDR  nevertheless  has  the  immense  advantage 
of enjoying  a  certain stability,  since  it represents  the 
weighted average  of the  values of  the  currencies,  some  of 
which  appreciate  when  others depreciate. 
To  meet  the  ever-growing payments  needs  of 
different countries,  paricularly the  developing  countries 
and  the  oil-importing countries,  the  IMF  has  regularly 
reviewed  quotas  and  hence  drawing  rights  in  the  years 
following  the  decision of June  1974.  For all  that,  the - 17  -
monetary  system has  become  more  and  more  unstable  and  is 
characterized by  the widespread,  unmanaged  floating of 
currencies  (except  for  the  small  nucleus of countries 
still left in  the  European  "snake"  following  the  with-
drawal  of France  in July" l975). 
Experts  have  not  lost hope,  however,  of re-
introducing working  rules  acceptable  to  the majority of 
countries.  A  step  in  this direction was  the  Jamaica 
Agreement  adopted  by  the  Committee  of Twenty  on  7  and 
8  January  1976  on  the  basis of studies carried out  by 
the  Interim Committee.  A  number of observers  even  saw 
another Bretton Woods  in  the  overall  agreement  worked 
out  in  Jamaica. 
Under  this agreement,  an  attempt  was  made  to 
base  the  international  monetary  system  on  a  reserve  asset 
that  is not  the  currency of any  given  IMF  member.  This 
principal  reserve  asset  is· the  SDR.  At  the  same  time 
gold  lost its privileged position and  its role  as  a 
standard. 
The  Jamaica Agreement  provides for 
- abolition of  the  official price  of gold  and  authoriza-
tion for central  banks  to  carry out  transactions  in 
gold at prices based  on  market  rates; - 18  -
- removal  of the  reference  to  gold  from  the  Articles of 
Agreement  of  the  IMF.  Par values may  no  longer be 
expressed  in  terms  of gold  but must  be  expressed  in 
SDRs  or any  other denominator  decided  on  by  the  Fund; 
- the  gold  held  by  the  IMF  (154  million ounces  in all) 
to  be  either returned  to  members  or to  be  sold  for  the 
benefit  of the  developing countries,  over  a  period of 
four years. 
To  encourage  the  return  to  a  system of stable 
but adjustable parities,  the  Jamaica  Agreement  stipulates, 
by  means  of an  amendment  to  Article  IV  of  the  IMF  Articles 
of Agreement,  that every  member  must  initially notify  the 
IMF  of the  exchange  measures  it intends  to  take. 
These  measures  may  comprise 
-either maintaining  the  value  of  a  currency  in  terms  of 
the  SDR  or  in  terms  of another  denominator other  than 
gold; 
- or maintaining the  value  of  a  currency in relation  to 
another member  currency  or currencies,  in  order  to 
form  joint float areas  (along the  lines of the  European 
"snake"); 
- or taking any  other step decided  on  by  the  member  in 
question. - 19  -
At  a  later date  - and  depending  on  international 
economic  conditions  - the  IMF  may  decide  by  a  majority of 
85%  (which  implies  US  agreement)  to  institute  a  system of 
stable but adjustable parities. 
These  parities will  be  fixed  in  terms  of  the 
snn  or any  other  common  denominator  chosen  by  the  Fund 
(though it will  be  neither  gold  nor  any  individual 
currency)  and  the  maximum  fluctuation permitted will  be 
4.5%. 
The  IMF  would  have  the  task of supervizing this 
arrangement  and  would  be  able  to  veto  any  parity adjustment 
that did  not  appear  to  be  justified. 
The  Jamaican  Agreement.,  which  officially came 
Into  force  on  1  April  1978,  thus  initiates a  cooperation 
strategy that  involves flexibility at  the  present  time 
and  firmer discipline  in  t~e future.  All  this will  only 
be  successful,  however,  if the  IMF  is able  to effectively 
exercise  the  powers  vested  in it and if the  members  are 
ready  and willing to  accept  the  IMF's  directives. - 20  -
Moves  to  organize  a  Community  monetary  system  (1) 
The  provisions  of  the  Treaty 
The  Treaty of  Rbme  lays  down  the  following 
two  general  principles in Article  3  : 
- the  abolition,  as  between  Member  States,  of obstacles 
to  freedom  of movement  for persons,  services  and 
capital; 
- the  application of procedures  by  which  the  economic 
policies of Member  States can  be  coordinated  and 
disequilibria in their balances  of  payments  remedied. 
(1)  As  regards  the  period  before  1973,  reference  can  be 
made  to  the  ESC  Report  and  Opinion  of  11  December 
1973  on  the  Communication  from  the  Commission  to 
the  Council  on  the  progress  achieved  in  the  first 
stage  of economic  and  monetary  union,  on  the  allo-
cation of powers  and  responsibilities  among  the 
Community  institutions and  the  Member  States essen-
tial  to  proper functioning of economic  and  monetary 
union  and  on  the  measures  to  be  taken  in  the  second 
stage of economic  and  monetary  union 
(Rapporteur  :  Mr  MAMERT). - 21  -
On  the  latter point,  the  Treaty provides  for 
coordination of  the  economic  policies of  the  Member 
States  through  cooperation between  their appropriate 
administrative  dep~rt~~nts and  between  their central 
banks  (Article  105); 
- libP.ralization of payments  connected with  the  movement 
of  goods,  cervices or capital,  as  well  as  transfers 
of capital  and  earnings  (Article  lOG); 
- policy with  regard  to  rates of  exchange  to  be  treated 
by  each  Member  State  as  a  matter of  common  concern 
(Article 107); 
- authorization for  the  Member  States  to  take,  for  a 
'itrictly limited period,  the  necessary measures  to 
counter  the  consequences  of exchange  rate alterations 
which  seriously distort conditions  of competition 
(Article  107); 
-mutual assistance  (which  may  take  the  form  of  limited 
credits)  decided  by  the  Council  by  a  qualified majority, 
where  a  Member  State  is  in  difficulti~s or is seriously 
threatened with difficulties as  regards  its balance  of 
payments  (Article  108); - 22  -
- the  possibility for  a  Member  State  to  take,  as  a 
precaution,  the  necessary protective measures  in  the 
event  of  a  sudden  crisis in  its balance  of payments 
(Article  109). 
As  regards  the  free  movement  of capital,  the 
Treaty provides  for 
- liberalization of  movements  of capital  connected with 
current  payments  between  Member  States  (Articles  67 
and  68); 
- progre:-;slve  coordination or  the  exchange  policies of 
Member  States  in  respect  of  the  movement  of capital 
between  those  States  and  third countries  (Article  70); 
- the  Commission  to  be  kept  informed  by  the  Member  States 
of  any  movements  of capital  to  and  from  third countries 
which  come  to  their knowledge  (Article  72); 
- authorization  by  the  Commission  for  a  Member  State  to 
take  protective measures  should  movements  of capital 
lead  to  disturbances  ln  the  functioning  of its capital 
market  (Article  73). - 23  -
The  in~titutions 
As  far as  monetary  institutions are  concerned, 
the  Treaty provides  onlY  .. for  the  setting-up of  a  Monetary 
Committee  (composed  of experts)  with  advisory status.  It 
has  the  following  tasks 
- to  keep  under  review  the  monetary  and  financial  situa-
tion of  the  Member  States  and  of  the  Community  and  the 
general  payments  system  of  the  Member States and  to 
report  rccularly  th~rcon to  the  Council  and  to  the 
Commission; 
- to  deliver opinionn  at  the  request  of  the  Council  or 
of the  Commission  or on  its own  initiative,  for  sub-
mission  to  these  institutions. 
Two  other institutions were  subsequently  found 
to  be  necessary 
- the  Committee  of Governors  of Central  Dank,  which  was 
set up  in  1964  and  whose  functions  were  re-defined  and 
expanded  by  the  Council  Decision of  22  March  1971; 
-the European  Monetary  Cooperation  Fund  (EMCF), .which 
was  decided  on  at  the  Paris  Summit  Meeting  in October 
1972  and  came  into operation on  1  June  1973. - 24  -
The  EMCF's  board  is composed  of the  governors 
of  the  EEC  central  bankH,  a  representative  of  Luxembourg 
und  a  representative  of  the  Commission.  The  Bank  for 
International  Settlements  in  Basle  acts  as  the  EMCF's 
agent  for  the multilateralization of claims  and  debts 
nnd  intra-Community  settlements,  which  the  EMCF  has  the 
task  of promoting. 
The  machinery 
As  the  weaknesses  of  the  international  monetary 
system  became  apparent,  so  the  idea of  a  genuine  economic 
and  monetary  union  supplementing  and  reinforcing  customs 
union  grew. 
As  early as  1962,  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy 
had  led  to  the  introduction of an  agricultural  unit of 
account  for  intra-Community  transactions  concerning  farm 
produce. 
In  1968  Mr  BARRE,  acting  on  behalf  of  the 
Commission,  submitted  (without  success)  a  plan providing 
for  : 
- a  commitment  on  the  part  of  the  Member  States not  to 
change  their parities without  mutual  agreement; - 2S  -
elimination of  the  marglns  of fluctuation of exchange 
rates between  EEC  currencies; 
- organization of mutual  financial  assistance  between 
EEC  countries  (it had  been  practically impossible  to 
apply Article  108  of  the  Treaty,  since  the  provisions 
were  not sufficiently precise). 
The  following year  the  Commission  issued  a 
memorandum  on  the  coordination  of economic  policies  and 
monetary  cooperation within  the  Community  (BARRE 
Memorandum),  calling for  : 
- greater alignment  of medium-term  economic  policies 
through better synchronization of national  ?rogrammes; 
- closer coordination of short-term policies  through 
more  intensive  inter-governmental  consultations,  com-
parison of budgets,  improvement  of statistics and 
application of  a  warning  indicator system; 
- the  introduction of Community  monetary  cooperation 
machinery  providing short  and  medium-term  support. 
The  broad  lines of this plan were  approved  by 
·the Council  in  January  1969  and  the  various  clements 
were  implemented  in  1970  and  1971. - 26  -
In  the  monetary  sphere,  the  short-term monetary 
support  system created  on  9  February  1970  involved  the 
setting-up of  a  1,000 million dollar support  fund  for  the 
granting of financial  assistance  for  a  period  of  three 
months, .renewable  at  the  market  rate.  But,  use  of  this 
fund  was  subject  to  such conditions -particularly as 
regards  interest rates  - that it offered hardly any 
advantage  over  the  swap  network  set up  on  the  initiative 
of  the  United States  (in which  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank 
formed  the  pivot). 
In order  to  move  ahead with  economic  and 
monetary union,  the  Heads  of State,  meeting at  The  Hague 
on  1  and  2  December  1969,  decided  to  work  out  a  plan 
(the  WERNER  Plan)  for  achievtng by  1980  a  genuine 
Community  monetary  system based  on 
- total and  irreversible  mutual  convertibility free  from 
fluctuations  in rates  and  with  immutable  parities or 
preferably their replacement  by  a  single  Community 
currency; 
- the  creation of liquidity  throughout  the  area  and  the 
centralization of monetary  and  credit policy; - 27  -
- transfer to  the  Community  authorities of  competence 
for  monetary  policy  towards  the  outside  world; 
- unification of Member  State capital  market  policies. 
The  disorder  in  the  international  monetary 
system,  however,  forced  the  Commission  and  the  Council 
to  take  more  urgent  steps,  and  the  Council  decided  on 
the  following  on  22  March  1971 
- the  introduction of medium-term  monetary  assistance 
machinery  in  accordance  with  the  BARRE  Memorandum; 
- intensification of  the  coordination of Member  States' 
short-term  economic  policies; 
- intensification of  the  cooperation between  Member  State 
central  banks,  particularly in  the  Committee  of Central 
Bank  Governors; 
the  introduction  as  from  1  June  1971  of machinery  for 
narrowing  the  margins  of fluctuation  between  the 
various  Community  currencies. - 28  -
The  narrowing  of exchange-rate  fluctuation  margins  or the 
usnake 11 
Under  the  European  Monetary  Agreemcr.t  of  1955 
between  the  European  CEEC  member  countries (which  came  into 
operation  in  1958  and  is now  defunct),  the  margin  of 
fluctuation  between  a  European  currency and  the  dollar 
had  been  fixed  at  1.5%  (giving  a  maximum  divergence  of  3% 
between  two  European  currencies). 
Under  the  decision of  22  March· 1971  the  maximum 
divergence  between  EEC  currencies  was  to  be  reduced 
initially to  1.2%,  with  further  reductions  to  follow. 
Intervention  was  to  be  exclusively  in  dollars,  and  so  the 
aim  of  reaching  agreement  on  intervention  in  Community 
currencies  was  deferred  to  a  later stage. 
7he  decision  of  22  March  1971  had  not yet  come 
into  force,  however,  when  a  wave  of speculation  in 
European  currencies  led  in  May  to  complete  disruption of 
the  foreign  exchange  markets.  The  crisis ruined  the  plan - 29  -
for European  monetary alignment,  and  on  15  June  1971 
the margin  of fluctuation between  the  German  mark  and 
the  French  franc,  instead of being  reduced  to  1.2%, 
increased  to  6  - 7%. 
The  Smithsonian Agreement  of December  1971 
introduced  new  parities and  widened  the  fluctuation 
margins  :  the  divergence  between  two  European  currencies 
could  now  reach  4.5%  (or  9%  over  a  period). 
On  21  March  1972  there  was  a  new  Community 
decision,  which  found  expression  in  the  agreement  of 
24  April  1972,  under  which  : 
- the  United  Kingdom  and  Denmark  (which  were  to  accede 
to  the  EEC  on  1  January  1973)  and  Norway  joined  the 
six  Community  States  in adhering  to  the  agreement  on 
the  narrowing of fluctuation margins; 
- the  intra-Community fluctuation  margin  was  reduced 
to  2.25%  (or  4.5% over  a  period); - :JO  -
- intervention  lo  keep  Lhe  ":;nakt:"  in  the  "tunnel"  was 
to  be  in dollars,  but  any  intervention  to  keep  each 
of  the  European  currencies  in  the  "snake"  was  to  be 
in  Community  curre~cies,  which  meant  the  setting-up 
of  an  intra-European  settlement  system. 
Management  of  the  Community  foreign  exchange  system 
The  European  summit  meeting  in October  1972 
confirmed  these  decisions  and  redefined  the  functions 
of  the  European  Monetary  Cooperation  Fund,  which  were 
initially to  be  as  follows  : 
- concc rtcd  ac lion  among  th"  cc·r. L ral  banks  for  the 
purpose  of narrowing  currency  fluctuation  margins; 
- the  multilateralization of positions  resulting from 
interventions  in  Community  currencies  and  the  multi-
lateralization of  intra-Community  settlements; 
- the  use  for  this  purpose  of  a  European  monetary unit 
of  account; 
- the  adm1nistration  of  short-Lcrm monetary  support 
among  the  central  banks  (introduced  in  Fvbruary  1970). - 31  -
The  EMCF's  machinery  is as  follows 
- An  accounting  system  for  claims  and  liabilities resul-
ting from  interventions  by  central  banks  in  Community 
currencies  for  the  purpose  of ensuring observance  of 
the  limits of fluctuation  indicated above. 
- A  system  for  offsetting claims  and  liabilities resulting 
from  one  and  the  same  accounting period  and  which,  for 
this purpose,  are  expressed  in  a  common  denominator 
(the  European monetary unit  of account).  This  EMUA  is 
still defined  in  terms  of gold,  which  is  inevitably a 
theoretical definition since  gold has  lost its former 
functions  as  an  international  means  of payment,  etc. 
However,  the  anachronism  of  the  gold-based de:finition 
docs  not  cause  any difficulty and  the  necessary  trans-
actions  are  conducted  by  using  EMUA-national  currency 
conversion  rates. 
-A system  of very  short-term credit of unlimited  scope 
for  an  "end  of month  - 30  days"  period  (corresponding 
on  average  to  a  45-day  period)  automatically  renewable 
for  three  months  within  a  limit equal  to  the debit 
share  of  the  central  bank  concerned  in  the  short-term - 32  -
monc• t.ary  ::uppn r I..  'J'h is  rcnc·wa 1  rae  111 Ly  can  be  used 
only  to  the  extent  that  it does  not  lead  to  continuous 
indebtedness  for  more  than  six consecutive  months. 
- A  system  for  settlements,  operating according  to  the 
composition  of  the  reserves  (dollars,  SDRs,  reserve 
positions  in  the  IMF)  held  by  the  debtors. 
Operation 
The  main  ideas  behind  the  creation of  the  EMCF 
stem directly  from  the  traditional  practices of  the 
central  banks,  which,  of  cour~:l',  had  left  a  very  clear 
mark  on  the  agreement  0f  10  April  1972.  They  arc 
evident  in particular ln 
a)  The  institutional  features  and  the  practical operation 
of  the  EMCF,  the  central  banks  tending  to  avoid  as 
much  as  possible  the  Board's  supervision,  which  some 
central  banks  (in particular the  Bundesbank)  consider 
to  constitute  an  encroachment  on  their legal  preroga-
tives as bodies  which  enjoy  relative  autonomy  vis-a-vis 
governments. - 33  -
b)  The  Jack  of  nuLomntlc  nffseLling over  time  in  relations 
between  banks  of  issue;  thus,  although operations  con-
ducted within one  accounting period  (one  month)  are 
multilateralized with  a  view  to  being offset,  there  is 
no  automatic  offsetting between  positions  taken  from 
two  different accounting periods.  One  and  the  same 
central  bank  may,  in principle,  be  a  creditor and  a 
debtor  simultaneously  in  the  EMCF's  books.  However, 
offsetting "by  arrangement"  docs  take  place  in practice. 
,-)  flilateralism still occurs 
ln  theca:;<·  of  renr,wal  by  mutual  agrcem~:nt;  this  js 
POI:I:ib]<, 
where  a  debt has  already  been  renewed  automatically 
for  three  months;  and 
where  a  debt  exceeds  the  debit  share  of  the  central 
bank  concerned  in  the  short-term monetary  support. 
- in  connection with credit  extended  as  short-term 
monetary  support  :  in this  way  each central  bank  can, 
for  example,  stipulate  the  currency  in  which  it - 34  -
extends  a  given  credit;  in  the  case  of  the  credit 
granted  to  Italy,  all  the  central  banks  chose  the 
US  dollar at an  exchange  rate  frozen  at the  level 
prevailing at  the  time  the  credit was  made  available; 
in  view of  the  slenderness  of  the  resources  available 
under  this credit  system  and  the  risks  which  any  bank 
using it would  run,  the  banks  of  the  countries  in  the 
"snake"  have  never  used  it;  in  most  cases  they  have 
even  made  only  limited use  of  the  system  of very 
short-term credit preferring to  re-establish their 
position by  re-purchasing  their currencies  on  the 
market. 
d)  The  changes  which  have  come  about  in  the  application 
of  the  initial rules  concerning  interventions;  these 
r,eem  to  be  very  much  influenced  by  the  desire  to  have 
an  automatic  mechanism.  This  aim  has  not  been  fully 
achieved  owing  to  the  complex  situations which  occur. 
In practice,  consultation procedures  have  been  intro-
duced.  In  theory  the  consultation  takes  place  in 
advance,  but  frequently  it is on  an  a  posteriori  basis, 
that  is  to  say,  action  is announced  which  has  already 
been  taken  or which  is being prepared.  In  the  latter 
case,  the  action is postponed  should  the  relevant 
central  banks  have  objections. - 35  -
c)  l.aHtly,  t.he  t"ndcncy  to  1 imi t  the  powers  of  the  EMCF 
for  the  reasons  given  in  (a)  and  (c)  above  has  been 
accentuated  by  the  fact  that  the  central  banks .make 
only  limited  and  occasional  use  of  Community  currencies 
in  their interventions.  The  dollar is most  frequently 
used,  but  in  this  case  the  interventions are  not 
registered in  the  books  of  the  EMCF  and  therefore  do 
not  give  rise  to  offsetting.  This  trend  can  be  put 
down  to  several  factors,  including  the  following  : 
From  a  purely  technical  point  of view,  the  fact  that 
positions are  settled in  the  EMCF  mostly  in dollars 
(now  that  gold is no  longer used)  and  the  fact  that 
the  limited size  and  duration  of  the  very  short-term 
credits  do  not  encourage  countries  in  the  "snake"  to 
take  advantage  of  EMCF  machinery. 
From  a  wider  point  of view,  the  fact  that  the  dollar 
continues  to  a  great extent  to hold  the  key  position 
in  international  currency  relationships  and  that  the 
monetary authorities consistently baulk at  remedying 
this  situation for  fear  that  reform,  within  a  European 
framework,  will  lead  to  changes  looked  on  as curtailing 
national  monetary  sovereignty. - 36  -
13alanr.e  shr~r't  of  Lhr~  movc~s  to  organize  a  Community 
monetary  system 
After  the  conclusion of  the  agreement  of 
24  Apri 1  1972,  thf'  international  monetary  system 
experienced many  upheavals  which  shook  the  foundations 
laid at Washington  in  1971.  It was  the  Jamaica 
Agreement  (which  has  just  come  into  force)  that enabled 
new  rules  to  be  drawn  up. 
The  oil crisis,  inflation,  and  the  resulting 
balance-of-payments  disequilibrium  in  many  countries 
further aggravated  the  currency situation  throughout 
the  world. 
In  the  Community,  only  five  of  the  nine 
countries participate  in  thr.  ",;nakc".  The  United 
Kingdom,  Italy and  France  have  lr.ft  in succession, 
while  Ireland was  unable  to  join.  The  exchange  rate 
fluctuations  between  the  "snake"  currencies  and  the 
currencies  that are  no  longer  in  the  "snake"  have  been 
considerable  (over  8  years,  from  September  1969  to 
October  1977,  the  German  mark  has  appreciated  by  60.4% 
in relation to  the  French  franc  and  by  139.3%  in  rela-
tion  to  the  pound  sterling. 
While  the  Community's  aggregate  balance  of 
payments  on  current  account  is now  in  surplus,  there 
are still disequilibria  in  a  number of Member  States. - 37  -
Despite  the  introduction of monetary  compen-
satory amounts  in  1969,  exchange-rate  rluctuations are 
complicating the  operation of  the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy. 
While  the  mutual  assistance provided  for  in  the 
Treaty of Rome  has  helped certain Member States,  it has 
not  led  to  genuine  solidarity owing  to  the  lack of an 
effective mechanism  for  intervening on  the  exchange 
markets. 
The  economic  and  monetary union project  haS 
been  stagnating.  As  the  Commission  noted  in  its 
Communication  of  17  November  19//  : 
"the  intermediate  objectives originally set 
have  not  been  achieved  and  the  transition to 
a  second  stage  on  the  way  to  economic  and 
monetary  union  has  not  taken place.  The 
system  introduced  in  the  monetary  field  now 
covers  only  a  few  of  the  Member  States". - 38  -
The  Commission  also  makes  the  following 
observation  : 
"The  division of  the  Community  into ill-
coordinaLed  monetary  zones  has  been  perpetuated; 
divergences  in  the  value  of currencies  have 
jeopardized  the  unity of agricultural prices 
and  freedom  of movement  for agricultural  pro-
ducts.  The  customs  union  itself,  though  pre-
served  intact  in its essentials,  continues  to 
be  threatened  by  the  temptation of  a  return 
towards  national  markets". 
2.  The  present  monetary  situation 
The  main  monetary  events  since  the  Bretton 
Woods  Agreement  having  been  outlined,  it is possible  to 
dcflnc  the  basic  features  of present currency  rclation-
Hhlps  in  the  world  as  a  whole  and  within  the  EEC  in 
particular. 
Main  features  of world  currency  relationships 
The  situation  in  which  the  Jamaica  Agreement 
is being applied  is very different  from  that at  the  end 
of  the  Second World  War  in which  the  Bretton Woods 
Agreement  came  about. - 39  -
The  United States  no  longer officially holds 
the  pre-eminent  position it had  immediately after the 
War 
- the  USA  then  held  80%  of world  gold  stocks,  whereas 
it now  has  only about  25%; 
the dollar is  no  longer convertible  into  gold at  a 
fixed  rate  and  can  no  longer play  the  role  of  a 
monetary  standard; 
- the  United States•  permanent  deficit  on  its balance 
of  payments  gives  grounds  for  a  growing  lack  of  con-
fidence  in  the  dollar.  Since  1971,  the  dollar has 
considerably depreciated  in  relation  to  the  German 
mark,  the  yen  and  the  Swiss  franc,  which  are  consi-
dered  to  be  strong currencies. 
On  the  other hand,  the  dollar is still widely 
used  as  a  reserve  currency by  the  central  banks  and  as  a 
money  of account  or settlement  for  the  bulk of inter-
national  commercial  transactions.  International  claims 
are  frequently denominated  in dollars.  For  the  United 
States  this  has  the great  advantage  of enabling it to 
pay  for its imports  - and,  in particular,  its oil 
imports  - in its own  currency without  having  to  worry 
about  keeping its balance  of payments  in equilibrium. - 110  -
There  are  many  countries whose  currencies are 
still  tied  de  facto  or de  jure  to  the  dollar  (Canada, 
Japan,  certain countries  in  the  Far East  and  Latin 
America,  South Africa,  Israel,  etc.),  forming  what  can 
be  regarded  as  a  real  dollar area.  The  extent  and 
cohesion of  this area are at present  seriously jeopar-
dized by  the  instability of  the  dollar rate of exchange 
owing  to  structural  factors.  This  instability is liable 
to  increase  rather  than  diminish  in  the  coming.years 
(considerable  and  growing deficit  on  the  US  balance  of 
payments,  difficulties hampering  intervention  by  the 
US  monetary  authorities  to  support  the  dollar,  due  in 
t.hn  main  Lo  the  fact  that  thu  bulk of  US  reserves  arc 
Jn  gold  - 12,000 million  dol La~s out  of 19,000 million 
dollars at  the  ufi"ieial  rat:c•  or 43  dollars per  ounce  of 
gold,  or  110,000  million  dollar~ out of 47,000 million 
dollars at the  market  rate of  180  dollars per ounce  of 
gold). 
The  pattern of central  bank  holdings  of foreign 
exchange  reserves  is now  very different  from  that  just 
after the  Second  World  War  and  at  the  time  of  the  dollar 
gap.  These  world  reserves were  estimated by  the  IMF  to - 1!1  -
anount  to  2S9,900 million  SDRs  (1  SDR  ~  1.28 dollars)  ns 
at the  end of January  1978,  and  breakdown  as  follows  : 
- United  States  ...............  36,720 million  SDRs 
- Federal  Republic  o-f ·Ge-rmany  34,140 million SDRs 
Japan  .......................  20,050 million  SDRs 
- Switzerland .................  11,070 million  SDRs 
- OPEC  countries  ' .............  60,840 million  SDRs 
- L."ltin  America 
(excluding Venezuela)  .......  15,51!0  million SDRs 
- Other  indufltrialized 
countries ................... 1'10,110  million  SDRs 
It can  be  seen  that  three countries are 
clearly  in  the  lead- the  United  States,  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  and  Japan  (whose  foreign  exchange 
reserves  rose  by  25%  in  the first  three  months  of 1978). 
This  inevitably means  that  these  countries carry special 
responsibilities in stabtlizing the  international 
mo:-~etary system. 
It should .be  stressed  that  these  exchange 
reserves  include  (besides  gold  and  foreign  currencies, 
in many  cases  the  dollar)  a  new  element  - the  SDR,  whonc 
stability  in  relation  to  certain currencies  is  a  great 
advantage.  The  value  of  the  SDH  is not  "quoted"  but is - 42  -
ba::nd  on  the  weighted  exchange  rates of  a  basket of 
currencles,  some  of which  rise  when  others  fall.  Some 
countries arc  heavily  in  debt  and  their indebtedness 
is constantly  increasing.  This  is particularly the 
case with  the non-oil-producing developing countries, 
which  have  not  derived any  real  benefit  from  the  increase 
in  the  price of energy  and  industrial  raw  materials but 
rather have  suffered  from  this  increase.  This  Third 
World  indebtedness  towards  the  industrialized countries, 
which  is at present  estimated  to  amount  to  250,000 
million dollars,  exceeds  the  debtor countries'  ability 
to  pay  and calls for urgent,  coordinated  international 
solutions. 
The  volume  of international  liquidity has 
grown  considerably  in  recent  years,  rising  from  85,000 
million dollars  in  19'l0  to  300,000 million dollars  in 
19'l'l.  Euro-currencies  (Euro-dollars  and  petro-dollars 
in particular)  stemming  in  large  measure  from  the  ever-
growing deficit  on  the  US  balance  of payments  and  to  a 
lesser degree  from  the  deficits of other countries, 
from  a  mass  of  liquidity and  short-term capital  that 
poses  a  constant  threat  to  currencies. - 43  -
The  Bretton  Wood!;  Agreement  made  possible  the 
de  f'a<:to  cl imination  of exchaneo  control  and  the  intro-
duction  of extensive  convertibility which  has  facilitated 
the  development  of  international  trade  over  the  past 
decades. 
But,  gold  and  the  dollar lost  their status of 
monetary  standard  owing  in particular to  the  laxity of 
the  United  States  in  the  conduct  of its economic  and 
monetary  policies  and  the  rapid  inflation which  was  a 
feature  of many  economics,  particularly since  the  quad-
rupling of oil prices.  The  system of  fixed  exchange 
rates  introduced at Bretton  Wood~ gave  way  to  general 
floating  of currencies until  the  Jamaica  Agreement, 
which  provided  for  a  return  to  ~table but  adjustable 
par values,  inaugurated  a  new  monetary  system. 
Of  the  arrangements  introduced  under  the 
Bretton  Woods  Agreement,  certain credit and  settlement 
machinery still exists.  This  is  supervised  and  adminis-
tered  by  the  IMF,  which  is still  the  essential  instrument 
of  international  monetary  coordination.  In  recent years 
the  IMF  has  constantly  increased  its resources,  particu-
larly since  the  introduction of  SDRs  in  1968.  After  the 
sixth  increase  in  quotas  on  1  April  1978,  the  credits 
at  the  disposal  of  the  IMF  amounted  to  39,000 million 
SDRs  (48,000 million dollars),  broken  down  as  follows - 44  -
-United States  •.....•...•.•......•••. 21.5% 
- EEC  ...•.••••••.••••..••.••....••••••  27  % 
-OPEC  countries  ••..•....•...•..••.•••  10  % 
- Developing countries ................ 20.9  % 
-Other industrialized countries  ...•.• 16.8% 
The  new  majority  required for  IMF  Board 
decisions is 3/5ths of  the  members  (with  15%  of  the 
quotas  constituting a  blocking minority). 
At  the  meeting of the  Interim Committee  of 
the  IMF  Board  of Governors  in Mexico  on  29  and  30 April 
1978,  the  possibility of a  seventh  increase  in quotas 
and  general  use  of  SDRs  was  discussed. 
There  is a  move  towards  a  rule  under which  the 
old  25%  gold  tranche  would  be  paid  in  SDRs.  This  raises 
the  problem of the  return  on  net  holdings  in  SDRs,  the 
right to hold  SDRs  and  the  creation of a  real  SDR  market. 
In order  to  prevent  the  growth  of international  liquidity 
that would  result  from  the  quota  increases,  the  bene-
ficiaries of new  SDR  allocations  (particularly  the 
developing countries)  could undertake  to  pay  the - 45  -
equivalent  into  a  consolidation account  in dollars or 
a  reserve  currency.  This  matter  is at present  being 
studied  by  the  IMF. 
·The  consequences  and  risks  of  the  present  monetary 
situation 
The  criticisms which  the  operation of  the  IMF 
at present  gives  rise  to  relate mainly  to  the  fact  that 
the  IMF  acts  pragmatically  rather  than  following  any 
clear-cut policy. 
Thus,  quotas  are  often  increased  for political 
reasons,  and  the  unsystematic  creation of  SDRs  can  lead 
to  a  permanent  temptation  for  some  countries  to  remedy, 
or defer  remedying,  structural  imbalances  in  this way. 
As  the  role  of  SDRs  and  their position  in 
international  liquidity and  foreign  exchange  reserves 
become  more  important,  the  IMF  Board  will  have  to  pursue 
a  rigorous  policy  on  quotas,  baslng itself on  objective 
economic  data,  as  was  attempt('d  when  the  IHF  was  set up. - 46  -
'l'hll  gun<•r·a l  floating of Cl,.lrrcnci es without 
any  reference at all  has  more  serious  consequences. 
Some  members  of the  Section consider  that 
floating makes  possible  automatic  adjustment  of  exchange 
rates  in line with  the  depreciation or appreciation of 
the  currencies resulting from  the  economic  policies 
pursued.  In their view floating is  therefore  a  liberal 
mechanism  that  through  a  series of balancing effects, 
give  rise  to  adjustments  compensating  for  the  domestic 
depreciation or an appreciation of currencies,  it 
produces  the  normal  consequence  of inflationary situa-
tions.  A  country which  has  more  severe  inflation  than 
.Its trading partncrs.will  sec  its currency depreciate 
on  the  foreign  exchange  market,  which will  lead  to 
automatic  compensation  enabling it to  maintain its 
exports  and  reduce  its imports. 
According  to  the  supporters  of  this  theory, 
the  only  way  to  control  exchange-rate  fluctuations  is 
to  take  economic  policy measures  that will  combat 
inflation and  balance  of payments  disequilibria and 
hence  the  domestic  depreciation of  the  currency.  A 
suitable  economic  policy is  therefore  the  necessary 
precondition for  a  return  to  a  system  of stable  exchange 
rates  (possibly with periodic  adjustment). - 47  -
Against  this  theory it may,  however,  be 
argued  that disorderly  rloating has  numerous  drawbacks. 
First or all,  it creates uncertainty  in 
commercial  contracts  and  is  liable ultimately  to  arrect 
these  transactions  and  hence  the  development  of  inter-
national  trade.  This  is all  the  more  serious  since 
international contracts  for  major  items or equipment 
such  as  ships,  aircrart,  industrial plant,  conventional 
and  nuclear power  stations,  port  installations,  and 
even  certain contracts  for  the  supply  of energy  or  raw 
materials,  extend  over  a  number  of years. 
On  top  of  the  risks  that  firms  or States 
normally  take  when  they  conclude  such  contracts,  there 
are  exchange  risks against  which  it is difficult or 
expensive  to  secure  protectton. 
Disor_:,derly  floating alfw  leads  to  excessive 
appreciation or depreciation  of certain currencies, 
resulting in export  or  import  difficulties and  abnormal 
economic  imbalances. - L\8  -
Furthermore,  certain countries  may  be  tempted 
to  use  the  depreciation of  thnir currency  as  a  way  of 
strengthening  their competitive  position or stimulating 
economic  activity. 
Floating may  form  an  easy  way  out,  at least 
temporarily,  for certain States.  These  States believe 
that floating  relieves  them  of  the  need  to act  early to 
defend  their currency and  restore  their balance  of 
payments  equilibrium. 
before  exchange-rate  adjustments  have  even 
been  able  to  have  any  balancing effect,  inflation will 
have  been  fuelled  by  the  rise  in  import  prices  and  by 
currency  speculation  by  economic  operators  seeking  to 
hedge  against  exchange  risks or  to  anticipate  future 
exchange  rates.  This  speculation  may  take  the  form  of 
delaying  the  repatriation of  foreign  exchange  resulting 
from  co~mercial  transactions or of capital  transfers 
subsidiaries within  a  multinational  group. - 49  -
ThesP  operations  are  facilitated  by  the 
existence  of  large  volumes  of  liquidity which  further 
aggravate  the  anarchy  and  the  risks by  encouraging 
large-scale  operations  that  may  lead  to  certain 
currencies being hit for  more  or  less subjective 
economic  or political  reasons  (acceleration of price 
increases,  social  trends,  political  uncertainty,  etc.). 
The  countries  in question  have  no  effective  defence 
against  these  operations,  since  corrective action  takes 
time  to  work  through. 
The  harmful  effects of  the  current  inter-
national  monetary  anarchy  arc  further  aggravated within 
the  EEC. 
Exchange-rate  fluctuations  and  the  lack of any 
monetary  standard  reflect  the  absence  of  economic  soli-
darity  in  the  Community  and  form  barriers  to  the  freedom 
of movement  established  by  the  Treaty of  Rome.  Coopera-
tinn  between  the  Member  States  is also  hampered. 
The  Common  Agriculture  Policy is a  case  in 
point.  In  1962  a  money  of  account  was  created  for 
transactions  in  farm  produce.  This  was  the  agricultural - 50  -
unit of account,  in which  farm  prices were  fixed.  In 
1969  exchange  rate distortions  led  to  the  decision to 
introduce  monetary  compensatory  amounts  to offset 
currency fluctuations,  This  mechanism  is liable  to  be 
ineffective  in  the  case  of  rapid  and  large  fluctuations, 
such as  occurred at  the  beginning of  1978,  thus  jeopar-
dizing  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy and  the  free  move-
ment  of  farm  produce  that  forms  one  of  the  pillars of 
the  Community. 
The  Treaty provides  for  a  common  commercial 
policy  towards  third countries.  It is with  this  in  mind 
that  the  Community  has  engaged  in  the  GATT  negotiations 
in  Tokyo  and  Geneva  (to  be  completed  shortly).  One  may 
ask  whether  there  is any  poinL  in  negotiations  on  average 
protective rates of  8%,  when  it I~  known  that  exchange 
rate variations  may  far  exceed  that percentage  in  several 
months  or in several  weeks.  It Is clear that  in this 
context  agreements  with  third countries are pointless - :,]  -
and  that  no  common  commHrclal  pollcy is possible, 
although  it in  now  more  than  ever necessary for  the  EEC 
to  formulate  such  a  policy  towards its trading partners. 
II.  THE  REQUIREMENTS  FOR.RETURNING  THE  INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY  SYSTEM  TO  NORMAL 
The  aims  of  a  policy for  a  return  to  normal 
The  monetary  system  cannot  be  expected  to 
solve  economic  problems  by  itself and  remedy  the  imbalan-
ces  which  have  often been at  the  root of monetary dis-
parities. 
The  valut,  of  a  count.ry'n  currency  is not  un-
related  to  that country's  economic  situation without, 
however,  being an  exact  reflection  thereof.  This  is why 
it is possible  and  necessary  to  formulate  a  monetary 
policy  (like  a  policy on  prices,  incomes  and  credit), 
which  in  turn has  a  bearing  on  economic  policy. - 52  -
lt is  therefore vital  Lo  conduct  a  suitable 
economic  policy  in parallel  with  monetary  policy;  so 
that  the  latter can  produce  a  certain measure  of cer-
tainty  in  international  commercial  transactions  and 
does  not  contribute  to  any  aggravation of economic 
disequilibria (inflation,  balance-of-payments deficits 
or surpluses). 
There  are  two  requirements  :  a  progressive 
return  to parities which  are  stable  but  adjustable  in 
the  light of countries'  economic  situations,  and  a 
normalization of capital  movements. 
This  incidentally was  the  aim  of  the  Jamaica 
Agreement  of January  1976,  which  provided  for  the  sub-
sequent.  introduclion,  by  a  qualified majority  of  85%, 
of a  system of stable but  adjustable par values defined 
in  SDRs  or any  other  common  denominator  chosen  by  the 
IMF  (but  not gold  or  a  currency)  and  with  a  fluctuation 
margin  of 4.5%. 
J!l!~  means  of achieving  a  return  to  normal 
This  is a  medium  or  long-term  aim.  The  return 
'"more  stable par values,  which  will at all events  be 
11  1:radual  process,  is impeded  by  two  major difficulties - 53  -
- th"  lack  of  any  international  monetary authority 
capable  of  unforcing  the  regulations  laid  down  and, 
where  necessary,  of applying  sanctions  for  undiscip-
lined behaviour.  Will  the  IMf  be  capable  of playing 
this  role,  after it has  shown  itself to  be  unable  to 
act  in  the  past?  At  any  rate  the  Jamaica  Agreement 
laid  down  the  principle  that  the  IMF  Is  to  supervise 
par  values  and  is  to  be  able  to  veto  any  par value 
change  it considers  to  be  unjustified; 
- the  lack of any  monetary  reference  standard.  Here 
the  role  previously played  by  gold  and  the  dollar 
could  be  taken over in  theory  by  either  a  unit  of 
account  defined  by  a  basket  of currencies  (the  Jamaica 
Agreement  suggests  the  SDR)  or another national  cur-
rency  (this solution was  ruled  out  by  the  Jamaica 
Agreement,  and  in  any  case  which  currency  would  this 
bt•'!)  <>r  any  other  rl!fercnr"!  u~i t  (one  based  on  commo-
di 1.  ief;  has  be<>n  :;uggesled). 
These  are  political  rather  than  technical 
problems,  although  the  technical  aspects  are  important. 
It is unlikely  that early international  agreement  can 
be  reached  on  these  problems,  mainly  because  of  the 
differences  between  national  rates of  inflation. - 54  -
Acr.ord I ngly,  it would  be  more  realistic  to 
aim at concerted  international  action  to  minimize 
t'xcesclvc  fluctuations  in  exchanee  rates  and  control 
to  some  extent  the  floatine of currencies or  groups 
of currencies,  as  has  been  done  under  the  "snake" 
agreement.  The  possibility has  been  mooted  of  forming 
a  dollar-German  mark-Yen  "snake"  (which  should  be  ex-
tended  to  embrace  a  Community  currency).  In  this way 
areas  of relative  currency stability could  be  created 
and  gradually expanded. 
But  the  joint floating of currencies is in 
fact  only possible  between  those  countries  which  have 
similar economic  policies. 
It.  also  presuppo:><·~;  a  common  will  to  defend 
par values  by  all  appropriaLe  technical  means,  such  as 
intervention by  central  banks,  variation of interest 
rates,  swap  agreements,  etc.,  although it must  be 
recognized  that  these  means  are  not  very effective  in 
the  face  of the  heavy  speculation in certain currencies, 
in which  growing  international  liquidity has  been  an 
important contributing factor. If any  evidence  is needed it is sufficient 
to  point  to  the  fact  that  over  the  past  few  months  the 
defence  of  the  dollar has  necessitated  the  doubling of 
the  dollar -German  mark- swap  agreements  from  2,000 
million to  4,000 million dollars  and  the  sale  by  the 
United States  to  the  Bundesbank  of  SDhs  for  740 million 
dollars,  with  the  known  outcome.  From  September  1977 
to  Vebruary  1978  the  Bundesbank  acquired  more  than 
6,000 million dollars,  while  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank 
devoted  only  1,500 million dollars  to  the  defence  of 
the  US  currency. 
Th<'  sec<,nd  rcquirc:m<•nL  J'or  rc-e~;tablishing 
inlernaLional  monetary  order  is  a  return  to  normal  in 
capital  movements.  This  means  first of all  limiting 
the  inordinate  increase  in currency  (and  Euro-currency) 
liquidity and  if possible  gradually  reabsorbing this 
liquidity. 
As  a  result of  the  deficit  on  the  US  balance 
of  trade,  60,000 million dollars are  added  annually  to 
this  liquidity  (in  February  1978  alone,  this deficit 
rose  by  4,500  million dollars). - 56  -
The  eeigniorage  attaching  to  the  dollar can 
be  threatened  only  by  exporters  to  the  United  States, 
who  could  refuse  to  accept  payment  for  their exports 
in  dollars.  But  although  such  action  is being  contem-
plated  (particularly by  OPEC  countries)  this  is  not  a 
very  realistic possibility at  the  present  time.  But 
an  agreement  mighL  perhaps  be  reached  with  the  United 
States  on  a  solution  to  this  situation.  A  return  to 
equilibrium  in  ~he United  States  trade  balance  seems, 
however,  rather uncertain  in  the  medium  term,  when  one 
considers  the  difficulties President  CARTER  is having 
in  getting his  energy  conservation plan accepted. 
There  also  arises  the  question  of  the  reim-
bursement  or cunsolidation of  the  dollar holdings  of 
non-US  residents  (Euro-dollnn; or petro-dollars),  which 
amount  to  almost  JSO,OOO  mi  I I ion  dollars.  An  agreement 
wit.h  lh<'  Unii.<Jd  SLate~·:  on  thi~:  :;ubjecl  is  es::>(•ntial, 
although  no  solution  i"  in  ::ight.  The  idea has, 
however,  been  put  rorward  of converting  these  holdings 
into  SDRs  within  the  IMF  framework  or of  investing  them 
on  the  US  capital  market  (for  example,  by  buying  shares 
in  American  companies). - 57  -
Such  opurntionD  would  have  the  advantage  of 
stabilizing the  international  capital market  and  of 
limiting  the  scope  for  foreign  exchange  transactions 
which  arc  not  connecte~with commercial  settlements but 
which  anticipate monetary  fluctuations  and  increase  such 
fluctuations. 
Within  the  context  of  an  international settle-
ment  there  also arises  the  problem  of  the  growing  in-
debtedness of the  non-oil-producing developing countries, 
and  the  settlement of  their debts,  which  often  exceed 
their ability to pay.  (Third World  indebtedness  to 
industrialized countries  is currently put  at  250,000 
million dollars,  with  the  public  debt  alone  amounting 
to  170,000 million dollars).  This  problem  was  raised 
by  the  group of  7~ developing countries at the  UNCTAD 
ministerial  meeting  in  Geneva  in  March  1978,  but  no 
solution could  be  found  thaL  was  acceptable  to  the 
industrialized countries.  Some  of the  latter came  out 
in  favour  of at  least  a  partial  remission of debts, 
while  others  give  preference  to  stabilization of  raw 
material prices.  Will  the  next  UNCTAD  conference,  which 
is to  be  held  in Manila  in  1979,  propose  solutions? - ~,a  -
III.  THE  ROLE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  ECONOMIC  COMMUNITY  IN 
MOVES  TOWARDS  A  RETURN  TO  NORMAL 
The  EEC,  like  the  rest of  the  world,  is  subject 
to  the  harmful  effects of  the  present  international 
monetary disorder.  Can  it play an  active  part  in  moves 
towards  a  return  to  normal? 
It could  set  itself  Lhe  task  of first  of all 
controlling  the  exchange-rate  fluctuations  between  Member 
States'  currencies.  Its  second  aim  should  be  to  work  out 
a  concerted policy  for  helplng  t"  restore  the  international 
monetary  syst('m  to  normal. 
Within  the  EEC 
Despite  the  lack of progress  towards  economic 
and  monetary  union,  it is necessary  to  continue efforts 
to  advance  the  harmonization  and  coordination of  the 
Member  States'  economic  policies.  Without  being  a 
necessary precondi:ion,  this could  greatly facilitate 
the  normalization  of currency  relationships  (the  same 
also  applies  to  short  and  medium-term  economic  policies, 
tax  harmon  i za  U  on,  soc lal  ha  rmnn i za  t ion,  the  common 
commercial  policy,  etc.). - 63  -
'!'he  Copr,nhagr:n  ::ummit  mc~eting,  which  dealt 
bn>adly  wiLh  Lhis  reform of  the  EMCF,  gives  grounds  for 
hopes  that may  take  on  concrete  shape  at  the  next  meeting 
of the  Heads  of Government  in  Bonn  in July  next. 
Some  members  consider  that  this  reform  could 
be  carried out  in  two  stages  : 
- In  the  first stage,  the  EMCF  should  be  able  to  inter-
vene  to  defend  the  par values  of Community  currencies 
by  multilateralizing swap  agreements  and  by  intervening 
on  the  exchange  market  with  currency or SDR  credit 
lines.  (The  figure  of  20,000 million dollars has  been 
mentioned  as  the  volume  of credit  needed  for effective 
intervention).  Credits  would  be  granted under  the 
supervision of  the  Council  of Ministers  in  accordance 
with  specific  rules concerning changes  in  exchange 
rates,  and  interest rate  policies.  The  economic 
situation in  the  countries  concerned  would  also  be 
taken  into account. - 64  -
- In  the  second  stage,  the  EMCF  could  itself grant 
credits by  a  qualified majority vote  of  its board,  in 
the  light  of  the  economic  situation  in  the  borrowing 
countries.  Thus  the  EMCF  could  act  as  a  kind  of  IMF 
at Community  level  by,  for  example,  vetting proposed 
changes  in  the  par values  of the  currencies  in  the 
European  "snake". 
Other  members,  however,  doubt  whether it would 
be  wise  to  use  a  qualified majority vote  as  the  basis 
for  granting credits  since,  if this happened,  there  would 
be  a  danger of countries with  balance-of-payments deficits 
making  excessive  use  of credits.  The  fact  that  very 
short-term  EMCF  assistance  is already automatic,  i.e.  is 
not  voted  on  in  any  way,  docs  not  in  itself suggest  that 
it would  be  expedient  to  apply  the  qualified majority 
principle  for  medium-term  assistance.  These  same  members 
also point  out  that  the  number  of votes allotted  to  each 
country  in  the  IMF  is determined  by  its quota,  and  this 
quota  system  is  the  basis  for  the  granting of credit. !n  or·dc·r  Ln  pave)  the  way  for the  introduction 
of  a  parallel  currency  that  would  not be  limited  to  the 
public  authorities,  it would  be  desirable  to  encourage 
use  within  the  Community  o~ the  European  unit  of account 
~or commercial  contracts  and  loans.  Induscry  and  trade 
would  have  to  be briefed  thorouehly  beforehand  for  this 
to  be  possible. 
Within  the  international  monetary  system 
Its domestic  monetary  policy having been 
de~incd,  what  role  can  the  Community  play  in  the  moves 
to  restore  normal  conditions  ln  the  international  monetary 
system? 
First of all,  it should  assert  a  common  position 
in  the  international  monetary  institutions,  especially  the 
IMF,  where  the  Member  States as  a  whole  carry  considerable 
weight  and  have  25%  of  the  votes,  i.e.  a  blocking minority 
enabling  the  Community  to  exert  considerable  influence  on 
IMF  policy,  vis-a-vis  the  other monetary  blocs,  particu-
larly  the  USA.  The  political will  for  this will  have  to 
be  mustered. 
From  a  strengthened position,  the  Community 
should  engage  in bilateral negotiations  - or negotiations -66  -
within  the  IMF  framework  - with  the  USA  aimed  at finding 
a  solution  to  the  problem  of  the  consolidation of  the 
dollar balances  held  by  Member  States,  so  as  to  enable 
these  assets  to  be  invested  on  the  US  capital market, 
for  example. 
Multilateralization of  swap  agreements  - with 
the  EMCF  acting as  intermediary  - so  as  to  include  the 
other monetary  blocs  (dollar or yen)  would  also  make  for 
better protection of par values  and  a  return  to  a  greater 
degree  of fixity  in  exchange  rates  throughout  the world. 
The  Community  should also  act  as  such  to  con-
trol  short-term capital  flows,  for example,  by  inter-
natlonal  coordination  of  interest  rate  policy  and  by 
laying down  a  end"  or  "n:-~ducl.  1'or multinational  enter-
priG<·:'  in  parUeular. 
In  this connection,  it would  be  expedient  to 
implement  Article  72  of  the  Treaty of  Rome,  which pro-
vides  as  follows  : 
"Member  States shall  keep  the  Commission 
informed  of any  movements  of capital  to  and 
from  third countries  which  come  to  their 
knowledge.  The  Commission  may  deliver to 
Member  States  any  Opinions  which  it considers 
appropriate  on  this subject." - 67  -
Finally,  the  Member  States  should  take  concerted 
action within  the  IMF  on  supervision of  the  creation of 
international  liquidity  (in  SDRs,  dollars or Euro-
currencies).  1'he  aim  should  be  to  control  the  excessive 
growth  of  this  liquidity  through  a  common  position 
vis-a-vis  the  responsible  authorities. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The  measures  proposed  can  facilitate  a  return 
to  a  certain degree  of normality  in  the  international 
monetary  situation  in  the  short  or medium  term.  The 
Community  must  not  abandon  the  objective  of complete 
economic  and  monetary  union,  in spite  of  the  failures 
and  setbacks.  In  the  present  international monetary 
disorder,  the  EEC  should  gradually  form  an  "area of 
stability",  which  would  help  in  restoring world  monetary 
equilibrium. 
The  ESC  will  rontinue  its work  in  this field, 
examining other aspects  of  economic  and  monetary  union 
with  the  aim  of determining  the  requirements  for  the 
creation of a  common  currency which  can  help  restore 
equilibrium  to  the  international  monetary  system. - 68  -
A  P  P  E  N  D  I  C  E  S - 69  -
Appendix  1 
TABLE  OF  MAIN  MONETARY  EVENTS 
Jul,y  1944 
1946 
1950 
1952 
1955 
1958 
1963 
8  Ma,y  1964 
September  1968 
1 <)69 
1970 
9  Februar,y  1970 
- Bretton  Woods  Conference 
- Setting up  of  the  IMF  with  44 
members 
- Creation of  the  European  Payments 
Union 
- Decision of  the  IMF  on  the  gold 
tranche 
- Belgium  introduces  the  two-tier 
exchange  market 
- Setting up  of  the  EEC  Monetary 
Committee 
- Compensatory  finance 
- EEC  Council  decision  on  cooperation 
between  Member  State central  banks 
and  prior consultation  on  parity 
changes 
- Decision  to  introduce  SDRs 
- The  Basle  agreement  settles  the 
problem  of sterling balances 
- Conference  at  The  Hague  lays  down 
the  principles of European  economic 
and  monetary  union 
- Approval  of  the  Werner  Plan 
- Introduction  of short-term monetary 
support  between  EEC  central  banks March  1971 
15  August  1971 
December  1971 
Beginning of  1972 
24  April  197  2 
June  1972 
Summer  1972 
January  1973 
February  1973 
March  1973 
April  1973 
September  1973 
- 70  -
- The  EEC  Council  lays  down  the 
timetable  for  EMU 
- The  United  States  suspends  the 
convertibility of  the dollar 
- The  Smithsonian  Agreement 
- Gold  hits  50  dollars  an  ounce 
- Birth of  the  European  "snake" 
- Sterling floats 
The  IMF  sets  up  the  Committee  of 
Twe~ty (including several  develc-
ping countries)  to  prepare  a 
reform  of  the  international 
monetary  system 
- Floating of  the  pound 
- New  surge  of world  speculation 
against  the  dollar  - new  devalua-
tion of  the  dollar  from  38  to 
42.22  dollars  an  ounce  of gold 
- Japan  and  Switzerland  decide  to 
allow their currencies  to float 
- The  countries of  the  "snake"  agree 
to  allow  their currencies  to  flcat 
against  the  dollar.  The  "snake'' 
leaves  the  "tunnel" 
- Creation  of  the  European  Monetary 
Cooperation  Fund  (EMCF),  admini-
stered by  the  Dank  for  International 
Settlements 
-Meeting of  the  Committee  of  Twe~ty 
in Nairobi  - Laying  down  of  new 
monetary  rules October  1973 
November  1973 
January  1974 
April  1974 
June  1974 
28  June  1974 
January  1975 
Early  1975 
10  July  19'/5 
August  1975 
31  August  1975 
- 71  -
- Energy  crisis  - oil prices 
quadrupled 
- The  French  franc  leaves  the  "snake" 
- Meeting  in  Zeist of  EEC  Ministers 
of  Finance,  who  decide  to  free 
gold  transactions 
- Meeting of  the  Committee  of Twenty, 
which  decides  that central  banks 
can  mortgage  their gold assets  on 
the  basis of the  free-market  rates 
- The  IMF  decides  chat  the  SDR  will 
be  fixed  in  terms  of  a  basket  of 
currencies  and  raises  the  interest 
rates  on  SDRz 
- The  gold holdings of  the  Bank  of 
France  are  revalued 
- The  United  States  re-opens  the  gold 
market 
- The  French  franc  rejoins  the 
European  "nnake" 
- Agreement  of  the  Group  of  Ten  on 
gold 
-Meeting of  the  Interim  Committee 
of  the  IMF  in  Kingston 
Revision  of  the  Articles of Agree-
ment  of  the  IMF  - Sixth revision of 
the  quotas September  1975 
November  1975 
December  1975 
7/8 January  1976 
March  1976 
Early  1978 
1  April  1978 
29/30  April  1978 
- 72  -
- Meeting of  the  IMF 
The  Group  of Ten  decides  that  the 
central  banks  can  buy  and  sell 
gold at  the  market  price  on  con-
dition that  they  buy  only  from 
the  IMF  or other central  banks 
(the  IMF  will  keep  tw0-thirds  of 
its gold) 
- Across-the-board  increases of 
quotas 
- Franco-American  declaration at 
Rambouillet  on  the  question of 
exchange  rate  stabilization 
- Publication  of  the  Tindemans 
Report  on  European  Union 
- The  Jamaica  Agreement  makes  SDRs 
the  pivot of  the  international 
monetary  system 
- The  French  franc  leaves  the 
European  "snake" 
- Seventh  revision  of  IMF  quotas 
- The  Jamalca  Agreement  comes 
officially into  force 
- Meeting of  the  Interim  Committee 
of  the  IMF  in  Mexico  - Study  of 
how  to  increase  IMF  funds. - 73  -
Appendix  2 
EUROPEAN  UNITS  OF  ACCOUNT 
The  European  Communities  use  various  units 
of account  in  the  major  sectors of activity. 
1.  The  gold-parity unit of account,  like  the 
old  dollar parity,  has  a  reference  weieht  of 0.88867088 
crams  of fine  gold.  Because  of the  big  changes  in 
exchange  rates  since  1969  the  gold-parity unit  of 
account  no  longer accurately reflects exchange  rela-
tionships  between  the  different  currencies  on  the 
market.  But  it is still used  in  some  areas of 
Community  activity  ~uch as  Common  Customs  Tariff 
transactions  and  the  Generalized  Preferences  Scheme 
for  developing countries  (e.g.  lf US  tobacco,  which  is 
not  subject  to  an  ad  valorem  duty,  is  imported  through 
Genoa  it pays  60%  less  duty  than  if it is  imported 
through  Hamburg  because  duties  are  expressed  in gold-
parity units  of account  and  the  conversion  rates  into 
national  currencies differ from  actual  market  rates). 
Until  the  end  of  1977  the  gold-parity unit  of account 
was  also  used  for  Community  budget  transactions. - '/4  -
2.  The  agrlcultural  uniL  of account  too  is 
officially defined  as  the  value  of 0.88867088  grams  of 
flne  gold.  But  in practice  prices laid  down  in  agri-
cultural units of  account  arc  converted  using  represen-
tative  rates,  which·apply only  to  agriculture.  Discre-
pancies  between  these  so-called  "green conversion  rates'', 
which  arc  normally fixed  each  year by  the  Council,  and 
actual  market  rates are  covered  by  the  Monetary 
Compensatory  Amounts  (MCAs).  The  agricultural  unit of 
account  is tied  to  the  currencies  of  the  Member  States 
in  the  "snake"  (West  Germany,  the  Iienelux  countries  and 
Denmark),  so  that  MCAs  are  paid  only  to  the  other Member 
States. 
3.  The  ~uropean Monetary  IJnit  of Account  (EMUA) 
has  the  same  fine  gold  value  as  the  other  two  units.  It 
is only  used  for  transactions  of  the  European  Monetary 
Cooperation  Fund.  The  central  banks  of  the  "snake" 
countries use  it for settling claims  and  liabilities 
arising out  of their currency market  dealings.  The  fact 
that  such  amounts  are  calculated  in  EMUA  constitutes an 
exchange  guarantee  and  enables credit and  debit  positions 
vis-a-vis  the  Fund  to  be  settled on  a  multilateral basis. - 75  -
4.  The  European  Unit  of Account  (EUA)  is based  on 
a  basket  of  fixed  amounts  of  the  currencies of  the  nine 
Member  States.  The  first step  in working  out  its value 
is to  weight  the  individual  currencies  in  the  basket. 
This  is done  by  taking  the  average  value  of each 
country's  GNP  and  foreign  trade  over  the  period  1969-
1974,  which  gives  the  following  percentage  weightings 
for each  currency 
DM  27.3  % 
FF  19.5  % 
£  17.5  % 
Lit.  14.0  % 
Hfl  9.0  % 
FB/FLux  8.2  % 
DKr  3.0  % 
£  Ir  1 . 5  % 
The  starting value  of  the  EUA  was  fixed  on 
28  June  1974,  the  same  day  as  the  SDR  basket,  and  like 
the  SDR  was  set at  1.2  US  dollars. - 76  -
The  value  of  the  EUA  is  found  by  adding 
together 3.66  FB,  0.14  FLux,  0.828  DM,  0.286  Hfl, 
£0.0885,  0.217  DKr,  1.15  FF,  109  Lit.  and£ Ir.  0.00759. 
The  value  of  the  EUA  in  each  of  the  national 
currencies  below  is  found  by  adding  up  the  value  in 
local  currency of each  of the  currencies  making  up  the 
basket  as  officially listed on  the  local  currency 
markets,  which  are  : 
Frankfurt 
Copenhagen 
Amsterdam 
Paris 
nomP/Milan  average 
London 
Dublin 
Brussels 
for  the 
for  the 
for  the 
for  the 
for  the 
for  the 
for  the 
for  Lhe 
German  Mark 
Danish  Krone 
Dutch  Guilder 
French  Franc 
Italian Lira 
pound  sterling 
Irish pound 
B<!lgian  Franc 
The  value  of the  EUA  changes  in  the  light of 
the  weighted  exchange  rate  movements  of all  the  basket 
currencies.  Thus  the  impact  of big changes  in  the  values 
of individual  currencies  on  the  EUA  is  lessened. - 77  -
The  EUA  lr>  already used  for  a  wide  range  of 
Communjty  business. 
a)  The  European  Dev~lopment Fund 
In  the  Council  Decision of  21  April  1975  it 
was  laid  down  that  development  aid paid out  under 
Article  42  of  the  Lome  Convention  would  be  expressed  in 
EUA.  Consequently,  recipients  who  have  to  use  their 
aid  to  make  purchases  in  the  EEC  Member  States  are  not 
at  the  mercy  of  sudden  fluctuations  in  the  value  of an 
individual  currency;  the  value  of their aid depends  on 
the  average  trend of all  the  Member  States'  currencies, 
so  that  there  is  a  certain measure  of security.  At  ~he 
same  time,  donor countries  aru. obl lged  to  provide  a 
certain  level  of aid  in  real  terms. 
b)  The  ECSC 
In  December  1975  a  Commission  Decision,  which 
was  fully  supported  by  the  Council,  made  it compulsory 
to  usc  the  EUA  for  ECSC  transactions. - 78  -
The  production  levies,  which  finance  some  80% 
of  the  ECSC  budget,  are  expressed  in EUA  as  a  fixed 
percentage  (0.29%)  per unit of production  and  then  con-
verted  into national  currencies.  This  ensures  that 
firms  in different  Member  States with  the  same  output 
pay  the  same  levy  and  that  a  competitive  advantage  is 
not  gained  through  tax rates being different. 
ECSC  expenditure,  which  goes  mainly  on  research 
and  development  work  in  the  coal  and  steel  industries, 
and  accounts  are  also  denominated  in  EUA. 
When  market  conditions  are  su:table  the  ECSC 
can  grant  loans,  but  this has  not  been  done  to  date. 
c)  The  European  Investment  Bank 
following  the  Board  uf Governors'  decisions 
of  18  March  1975  and  10  November  1977,  the  European 
Investment  Bank  now  uses the EUA  when  drawing  up  its 
balance  sheet. - 79  -
d)  The  Community  Budget 
In April  1976  the  Council  a~proved the 
Commission's  intention  to  use  the  EUA  in  the  Community 
budget  from  1978  onward  and  do  away  with  the existing 
gold-parity unit of account.  The  Commission  was  given 
until  the  end  of March  1978  to  draw  up  an  Implementing 
Regulation  for  using  the  EUA,  so  that  from  that  date  on 
the  daily conversion  rate  could  be  used  for both budget 
receipts  and  expenditure. 
Using  the  EUA  will  make  no  difference  to 
receipts  that  come  from  the  Community's  resources,  but 
it will  ensure  greater fairness  when  Member  States' 
contributions  are  worked  out  in  national  currencies. - 80  -
It will  not  be  possible  to  use  the  EUA  for 
all  items  of expenditure  in  the  budget.  There  will  be 
no  problem using it for  expenditure  that  o~ly the 
Community  alone  can  determine,  such  as  subsidies. 
Similarly,  when  the  Community  purchases  goods  or ser-
vices its strong position as  a  major  customer will 
probably  ensure  that it is billed in  EUA.  The  EVA's 
attractiveness when  compared  with national  currencies 
will  play  a  significant  role  in  such  transactions. 
But  small-scale  purchases  of  goods  etc.  will 
in  future  be  expressed  in both  EUAs  and  the  relevant 
national  currency. 
Doing  away  with  the  gold-parity unit  of account 
has  made  it easier  to  keep  track of  budgetary  receipts 
and  expenditure  and  led  to  the  disappearance  of  the 
discrepancies  that  used  to  occur when,  for  example, 
ceilings were  placed  on  the  cost  of  government  orders - 81  -
"r  fines  were  laid  down  by  the  European  Court  of 
Justice.  The  amounts  concerned  sometimes  used  to  vary 
by  as  much  as  50%  depending  on  whether  the current 
market  exchange  rate  or  the  theoretical  exchange  rate 
of the  old unit of account  was  used. 
e)  Other  Areas 
A  number  of council  Directives  involve  using 
the  EUA.  Worth  mentioning  are  those  on  the  minimum 
amount  of liability capital  to  be  held  by  insurance 
companies  and  the  publication of government  orders 
OV<'r  a  certain  amount  in  the Official  Journal  of  the 
European  Communities. 
At  the  end of  1977  the  Community's  medium-
term  financial  aid was  expressed  in  EUA.  All  credit 
granted  out of  this aid  to  countries with  balance-of-
payments  difficulties and  the  interest payments 
involved  are  concerted  into  EUA. 
Financial  transactions with  non-member 
countries  arc  increasingly being expressed  in  EUAs. - 82  -
B.  OPINION  OF  THE  ECONOMIC  AND  SOCIAL  COMMITTEE  ON  THE 
CmlMUNITY  APPROACH  TO  THE  PRESENT  INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY  DISORDER 
1.  General  Considerations 
The  Committee  considers  that  the  value  of  a 
country's currency is not unrelated  to  that  country's 
economic  situation without,  however,  being  an  exact 
reflection  thereof.  While  the  monetary  system  cannot 
be  expected  by  itself to  counterbalance  serious  economic 
disturbances which  inevitably have  an  effect  on  exchange 
rates,  it is nevertheless vital  to  coordinate  economic 
and  monetary policies.  It is with  this  in mind  that  the 
Cvmmittee  has  discussed  the  matter under  review  and  is 
now  proposing guidelines  designed  to  restore  economic 
and  monetary  equilibrium. 
2.  The  Present  Monetary  Situation 
The  Worldwide  Situation 
International  currency  relationships arc  based 
at present  on  a  number  of factors  of varying  importance. 
The  main  factors  are  : - 83  -
- a  system of  short-term credit,  inherited  from  tt 
Bretton Woods  Agreement,  and  operated  by  the 
International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF).  Nearly  all 
countries of the  world,  apart  from  the  majority 
the  State-trading countries,  are  members  of  the 
- the  dominant  position of  the  United States delle 
this is not  convertible  into  gold  at  a  fixed  rat 
but  is still widely  used  as  a  reserve  currency  t 
the  central  banks  and  as  money  of account  or  set 
ment  for  international  transactions.  As  a  resu1 
the  United States can  pay  for its imports  - and 
particular its oil  imports  - in its own  currency 
without  having  to suffer any  consequences  of  a 
balance-of-payments deficit; 
the  absence  since  1971  of  any  eenerally acceptec 
monetary  standard  and  of  any  mandatory  rules  go" 
ning  the  rates of exchange  between  currencies 
(general  floating).  This  has  led  in  recent  year 
to  serious disturbances  in  exchange  rates,  despi - 84  -
- the  appearance  of  a  new  monetary  reference  unit  :  the 
Special  Drawing  Right  (SDR),  which  is a  new  form  of 
international  liquidity; 
- widespread  de  facto  convertibility and  the  disappear-
ance  of exchange  controls  on  current  account  transac-
tions,  at least in  those  countrtes which  account for 
the  bulk of world  trade; 
- a  very uneven  distribution of exchange  reserves  between 
countries,  some  of which  have  an  excessive  debt  burden; 
- a  large  volume  of international  liquidity held either 
by  the  central  banks  (estimated at  249,000 million 
SDRs  or  270,000 million dollars at  the  end  of 
September  1977),  or by  economic  operators  in the  form 
of  "Euro-currencies";  this  liquidity is being expanded 
in  the  main  by  the  united States balance-of-payments 
deficit and  also,  to  a  lesser degree,  by  other 
countries'  deficits. - 85  -
The  Situation  in  the  European  Economic  Community 
These  features  are also  found  in  the  European 
Economic  Community, .where  currency relationships  arc 
likewise  based  on  the  following  de  facto  or de  jure 
factors; 
-convertibility of all  the  EEC  currencies; 
-machinery  for offsetting claims  and  liabilities and 
a  short-term credit  system,  operated  by  the  European 
1-lonetary  Cooperation  Fund  (EMCF); 
- the  agreement  entered  into  by  the  members  of  the  EEC 
in April  1972  not  to  allow  their exchange  rates  to 
fluctuate  more  than  ?.25% agalnst  each  other.  Only 
five  of  the  nine  Member  State'"  are still participating 
in  the  joing float  - the  ";,nuke"  - introduced  under 
this agreement;  the  others either have  never parti-
cipated or  have  withdrawn; 
- considerable  disparities  in  the  volume  of  exchange 
reserves  held by  the  various  Member  States,  and  the 
worsening of exchange-rate  divergences  between  some 
currencies; - 86  -
- use  by  the·  ~nmmunlty Institutions  and  the  Member 
States of different units of account  which  act  as 
common  denominators  for evaluating  the  national 
currencies,  and  arc  linked  to  the  latter by  conver-
sion  rates  (the  European  Monetary  Unit  of Account 
(EMUA),  the  Agricultural  Unit  of Account  and  the 
European  Unit  of Account  (EUA),  the  value  of which 
is determined every  day  on  the  basis of  a  basket of 
Community  currencies). 
3.  The  Effects  and  the  Dangers  of  the  Present  Monetary 
Situation 
The  International  Position 
The  criticism now  levelled at  the  way  the  IMF 
operates relates essentially to  the  absence  of  a  clear-
cut  policy,  i.e. it operates pragmatically. 
Thus,  quotas  are  often  expanded  under 
pressure  from  certain countries,  and  there  may  be  a 
permanent  temptation  to  create  SDRs  in order  to  remedy, 
or postpone  remedying,  structural  imbalances. - 87  -
The  fact  that  many  currencies  arc  floating 
freely has  had  more  serious effects  : 
- lack of security  in  international  transactions,  which 
leads  economic  operators  to  cover  themselves  against 
exchange  risks  and  even  anticipate  future  exchange 
rates; 
- excessive  appreciation  or depreciation  of  the  curren-
cies of  some  countries,  resulting in export  or  import 
problems  and  abnormal  economic  imbalances; 
- tendency  for  certain  governments  to  take  what  seems 
to  be  an  easy  way  out  - at  least  temporarily;  these 
governments  believe  that  there  is no  need  for  them 
to  act early  to  defend  their currencies or restore 
their balance-of-payments  equilibrium; 
- a  temptation  for  some  countries  to  deliberately let 
their currency depreciate  so  as  to  stimulate  economic 
activity or strengthen  their competitive  position, 
and  in  this way  increase  their exports  and  reduce 
their  imports; - 88  -
- reinforcement  of  inflationary  tendencies. 
Lastly,  the  disorder  and  dangers  of  the 
present  situation are  further aggravated  by  the  exis-
tence  of  large  volumes  of liquidity.  This  encourages 
large-scale operations  that  may  result  in certain 
currencies being hit for more  or  less  subjective 
economic  or political  reasons  (acceleration of  price 
increases,  social  trends,  political uncertainty,  etc.). 
The  countries  in question  have  no  effective defence 
against  these  operations,  since  corrective  action 
takes  time  to  work  through. 
The  Position within  the  European  Economic  Community 
The  harmful  effects of  the  current  inter-
national  monetary  disorder are  reflected  in  the  EEC 
and  are  jeopardizing the  common  market. 
The  exchange-rate  fluctuations  and  the  lack 
of  any  monetary  standard  show  the  absence  of  economic 
solidarity in  the  Community,  and  form  barriers  to  the 
freedom  of  movement  established by  the  Treaty of  Rome. 
Cooperation  between  the  Member  States  is also  hampered. The  protection afforded  by  the  common  external 
tariff  (average  rate  of  8%)  is  in  danger  of being can-
celled out  by  the  present  wide  fluctuations  of  exchange 
rates,  which  make  agreements  with  non-member  countries 
under  the  auspices  of  GATT  ineffective. 
Despite  the  system  of  compensatory  amounts 
which  has  had  to  be  introduced  to  permit  its operation, 
the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  is  feeling  the  effects 
of  repeated  and  ever  growing monetary  upheavals. 
4.  The  Requirements  for  Returning  the  International 
Monetary  System  to  Normal 
Th0  Aims  of  a  Policy  for  a  Return  to  Normal 
The  monetary  system  cannot  be  expected  to 
solve  economic  problems  by  itself and  remedy  the  im-
balances  which  have  often  been  at  the  root  of monetary 
disparities.  Nevertheless  : 
it must  ensure  a  degree  of security in  international 
commercial  transactions,  and 
- it must  not  make  the  imbalances  worse  (inflation, 
recession,  unemployment,  balance~of-payment deficits 
and  surpluses). - 90  -
'l'hcr<•  ar<•  two  requirements  for  achieving  this; 
a  gradual  return  to  exchange  rates  which  are  stable  but 
adjustable  in  the  light of countries'  economic  situa-
tions,  and  a  return  to  normal  in  movements  of capital. 
The  Means  of Achieving  a  Return  to  Normal 
There  are  two  major  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
a  gradual  return  to  more  s"able  par values 
- the  inadequacy  of  the  rules  laid  down  and  the  lack of 
any  international  monetary  authority capable  of en-
forcing  them  (as  the  IMF  used  to  do)  and,  where 
necessary,  of applying  sanctions  for undisciplined 
behaviour; 
- the  lack of  any  monetary  reference  standard.  Here, 
the  role  previously played  by  gold  and  the dollar 
could  be  taken  over  in  theory  by  other standards. 
These  two  points are  political rather  than 
technical  problems.  It is unlikely that  an  early inter-
national  agreement  can  be  reached  on  them,  mainly 
because  of  the  differences  between national  rates of 
inflation. - 91  -
Accordingly,  it would  be  more  realistic  to 
aim  at concerted  international  action  in order to 
minimize  excessive  fluctuations. in  exchange  rates  and 
~rovide  some  control  over  the  floating of currencies 
ur groups  of currencies  (as  in  the  case  of  the  European 
"snake").  In  this  way  areas  of  relative  currency sta-
bility could  be  created  and  gradually expanded. 
The  joint floating of currencies  is,  in fact, 
only possible  between  those  countries which  have  similar 
economic  policies. 
Joint  floating also  presupposes  a  common 
political will  to  promote  the  stabilizatior. of  exchange 
rates  by  all appropriate  technical  means,  such  as  : 
- intervention  by  the  central  banks; 
- coordinated variation of  intcr<!St  rates; 
- swap  agreements. 
It should,  however,  be  recognized  that  these  means  are 
not  always  effective  in  the  face  of  the  heavy  specula-
tion  ir.  certain currencies,  in which  the  increasing 
international  monetary  liquidity is  an  important  factor. - 92  -
The  second  requirement  for  re-establishing 
international  monetary  order is  the  prevention  of 
speculative  movements  of capital  by  limiting  che  inor-
dinate  increase  in  cur~e~cy  (and  Euro-currency)  liquidity 
and,  if possible,  gradually  reabsorbing  this  liquidity 
under  an  overall  agreemenc  with  the  United  States  on  the 
repayment  or consolidation of dollar holdings  (almost 
half of which  are  in  chc  hands  of  the  central  banks), 
and  on  future  changes  ~n this  liquidity. 
In  the  immediate  future,  the  monetary  authori-
ties  of  the  countries  in question will  have  to  take  con-
certed action  to  limit  :he  undesirable  effects  o~ foreign 
exchange  transactions  wh~ch are  not  cor.ncc~ed with  com-
mcrc~al settlements or  investments  and  which  anticipate 
monetary  fluctuations,  increase  such  fluctuations  and 
jeopardize monetary  policy. 
There  is also  the  problem  of  the  growing 
indebtedness of  the  non-oil-producing  developing  coun-
tries  and  the  settlement of  their debts,  which  often 
exceed  their ability  to  pay.  (Third World  indebtedness 
to  the  industrialized countries  is currently put  at 
250,000  million dollars). - 93  -
5.  The  Role  of  the  European  Economic  Community  in  Moves 
towards  a  Return  to  Normal 
The  EEC,  like  the  rest  of  the  world,  is  subject 
to  the  harmful  effects of  the  pr,~;ent  international  mone-
tary disorder.  Can  it play  an  active part  in  moves 
towards  a  return  to  normal? 
The  Committee  believes  that  the  Community's 
first  aim  should  be  to  reduce  the  exchanee-rate  fluctua-
tions  between  Member  States'  currencies.  Its second  aim 
should  be  to  work  out  a  concerted  policy  for helping to 
restore  the  international monetary  system  to  normal. 
Such  a  policy might  embrace  the  following 
Within  the  EEC 
Promotion  of  a  strategy for  aligning and  co-
ord!~ating economic  policies which  (without  being  an 
essential  precondition)  could  help  to  restore  relation-
ships  between  Member  State  currencies  to  normal. - 94  -
Improvement  in  the  consultation and  decision-
making procedure  of  the  EEC  bodies  responsible  for 
monetary  questions  (the Monetary  Committee,  the 
Committee  of Central  Bank  Governors,  etc.)  and,  if 
necessary,  extending  their areas of responsibility and 
their powers  of initiative  to  enable  them  to  make  an 
effective  contribution  to  the  drawing  up  and  implemen-
tation of  a  Community  monetary  policy. 
Maintenance  of  the  present  European  "snake" 
for  the participating currencies.  The  other Community 
currencies  should  (re)join the  "snake"  within  a  reason-
able  period.  To  this end,  transitional  arrangements 
should  be  devised for  these  currencies.  Account  should 
be  taken here  of different inflation rates,  while  at 
the  same  time  efforts should  be  made  to  reduce  inflation 
at both  Community  and national  level. 
Permanent  cooperation  between  the  central  banks 
and  the  monetary authorities for  the  purpose  of identi-
fying  and  curbing short-term capital  flows  (e.g.  by 
adjusting interest rates). 
If these  aims  are  to  be  achieved,  it will  be 
necessary  to  reform  the  European  Monetary  Cooperation 
Fund  (EMCF),  whose  resources,  authority  and  areas of 
responsibility will  have  to  be  increased  so  that it can 
take  effective action. - %  -
In  the  immediate  future,  the  EMCf  could  net 
in  the  defence  of par values  by  multilaternlizing swap 
agreements  and  by  intervening on  the  European  exchange 
market  with  currency or  SDR  credit  lines.  This  would 
enable  it to  play  a  stabilizing role  under  the  super-
vision of  the  Council  of MiniEters,  which  should  draw 
up  rules  to  be  observed  by  the  EMCF  and  the  national 
monetary  authorities with  regard  to 
-parity changes, 
- the  conditions  for granting credit,  and 
- interest rate  policy. 
The  EMCF  board  would  in  future  make  an  annual 
rev! ew  of each  :,!ember  country's  economic  and  financial 
situations,  paying  due  regard  to  the  code  of conduct 
laid  down  by  the  Council  of Minist<'rs.  Where  an  appli-
cation  is  made  for  credit  the  country  in  question  would 
have  to  give  the  EMCF  every  guarantee  that  its intended 
policy is  in  keeping with  the  Council's decisions  on  the 
convergence  of  economic  policies.  The  EMCF  would  then 
grant  its credits with  due  regard  to  the  economic  and 
financial  policies of  the  applicant  country.  The  EMCF - 9fi  -
would  take  its dec:i0ions  on  the  grunting of credit  by 
a  qualified majority  bused  on  the  Member  States'  quotas, 
and  in  accordance  with  rules still  La  be  established. 
The  EMCF  would  thus  perform  at  Community  level 
functions  similar to  those  of  the  IMF. 
Encouragement  should  be  given  to  use  of  the 
EUA  as  money  of  account  for  intra-Community  business 
transactions.  Industry  and  trade  would  have  to  be 
briefed  thoroughly  beforehand  for  this  to  be  possible. 
Within  the  International  Monetary  System 
A~sertiGn of  a  common  EEC  position  tn  those 
interr.ational  !n<metary  institutions  in  which  the  EEC 
countries  together carry considerable  weight  (for 
Lnc;ta:-.ce,  the  H1F)  and  of  a  conrr  .. )l\  attitude  tnward:c 
non-member  countries  and  other monetary blocs. 
Opening  of negotiations with  the  United 
States  aimed  at consolidating the  dollar balances held 
by  Member  States,  particularly by  encouraging  the 
import  of capital  by  the  United  States. - 97  -
Multilateralization of  swap  agreements,  so  as 
to  Include  the  other monetary  blocs  (dollar or yen). 
If  there  is  no  concerted  action  on  the  fixing  of interest 
rates,  however,  care  should  be  taken  to  ensure  that  this 
mechanism  docs  not  have  any  adverse  effects. 
Channelling of short-term capital  flows,  for 
example  by  international consultation  on  interest  rate 
policy and  by  drawing  up  a  monetary  code  of conduct  for 
multinational  enterprises  in particular. 
Adoption of  a  common  EEC  position with  regard 
to  the  indebtedness  of  the  developing countries. 
Concerted  action on  the  part of  the  Member 
States within  the  IMF  to  veL  the  creation of  interna-
tional  liquidity  (in  SDRs,  dollars or Euro-currencies). - 98  -
6.  Conclusion 
The  measures  proposed  can  facilitate  a  return 
to  a  certain deeree  of normality  in  the  international 
monetary  situation  in  the  short  or medium  term.  The 
Community  must  not  abandon  the  objective  of complete 
economic  and  monetary  union,  in  spite  of  the  failures 
and  setbacks.  In  the  present  international  mon,~tary 
disorder,  the  EEC  should  gradually  form  an  "area of 
stab! 1 i ty",  which  would  help  in  rcc;toring  world  monetary 
equilibrium. 
The  ~sr will  ~nntinu~  It~  work  in  thi~  rtcld, 
examining other  a~pects of  economic  and  ~onetary union 
w-~ L  :-.  t hP  aim  C'::'  d·  ~  -~·r~~.~  -.: ng  Lhe  rcqui rcmL·nt~·  :'o!"'  the 
(~r•·ation  oi'  a  com~on  ·~u.·;··~nc:y  v;hi~h can  help  restore 
nquilibrium  to  t;t·,e  national  mon"tary  system. European  Communities  F.conomic  and  Social  Committee 
"Community  Appronch  lo  the  Present 
International  ~lonctar'Y  Oj :'order" 
Opi~ion of  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee 
Brussels  :  General  Secretariat of  the  Economic  and 
Social  CommittcP 
1978  - 98  par;es 
OK,  D,  E,  F,  I,  N. 
In order  to  minimize  the  harmful  effects of 
the  present  international  monetary disorder,  and  achieve 
its principal  task of reducing  the  exchange  rate  fluc-
tuations  between  Member  States'  currencies,  the 
Community  must  increase  the  resources,  authority  and 
area of responsibility of  the  European  Monetary 
Cooperation  Fund  (EMCF).  The  Committee  believes  that 
the  EMCF  should  act  as  a  kind  of  IMF  at Community  level. 
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